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(2) Forms of delivery
In its simplest form, delivery involves simply the handing over of the goods by the transferor to the transferee. However, delivery may take diverse forms.
Fundamentally, delivery means a giving of possession to the transferee. 5 Possession, as defined by Stair, means "the holding or detaining of any thing by ourselves, or others for our use...
[with] the inclination or affection to make use of the thing detained". 6 As Stair's words indicate, this requirement for holding or detaining can be fulfilled through the acts of another acting on the possessor's behalf. Possession held in this way is known as civil possession, as opposed to natural possession, which arises where possession is held personally.
If delivery means a giving of possession to the transferee, then delivery may be effected by any means by which the transferee may satisfy the requirements of possession. Thus, for example, delivery of goods in a locked store may be made by delivery of the key, this being known in Roman law as traditio clavium. 7 Where the goods are already in the custody of the transferee, the physical requirement for possession is already met, and so delivery requires only the transferee's intention to take possession (traditio brevi manu). 8 It appears also that, in certain circumstances, delivery may be held to have occurred even though the goods are still in the transferor's custody. This is the constitutum possessorium of the Civilian tradition. 9 Its scope is uncertain, but it appears that it may occur when the transferor's continued holding is on some new basis, such as a contract of hire. 10 Delivery occurs here because the transferor's continued holding is now on the transferee's behalf. The transferee thus acquires civil possession through the transferor.
As possession may be held civilly, through another's acts, delivery may be made to the transferee by handing the goods over to someone acting on the transferee's behalf, such as an employee or an agent. As we shall see, this idea has been extended to allow delivery of goods held in the custody of a third party, on the transferor's instructions, by intimation to that third party custodier.
Those forms of delivery that do not involve a direct handing over of the goods are often collectively known as "constructive delivery". 11 It is with the final form of delivery mentioned that this article is concerned, the delivery of goods in third party custody by intimation to that custodier. The purpose of this article is to explore the background and basis of this form of delivery.
B. BACKGROUND (1) Historical background
It is a common observation that Scots property law is strongly influenced by Roman law, 12 and the law of possession is no exception to this. 13 Most obviously, we see the use of Roman terminology and authority. 14 20 No doubt, at least part of the explanation for this is that the development of a legal system responds primarily to the practical demands placed on it. If there is no practical demand for the law to accommodate a particular development, then there is a good chance that that development will not occur. In the case of Scots law, R Brown plausibly attributes the impetus behind the development of this form of delivery to the bonding system created in the nineteenth century. 21 Under this system, goods could be imported without payment of the appropriate excise duty, on condition that they were warehoused under a double lock, one key being held by the revenue officer, the goods only being released on payment of the duty. Physical delivery thus being impossible, it was necessary to develop an alternative method.
There is, however, a theoretical problem with this form of delivery. It is unproblematic that the transferor's possession is held and exercised through the acts of another, the custodier. As we have seen, possession may be held civilly, through the goods remained unmoved, but the right to the cellar, and to the services of the keeper, was transferred, so that they were equally put into the civil possession of the buyer.
This, then, is a decision that delivery may occur where the goods are in a third party's custody.
The second group held that Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was correctly decided. However, that case, it was held, could be distinguished on the basis of that in the present case sub-sales had followed on from the original transaction. By granting a delivery order to the first purchaser, Tod & Co had allowed that party to assume the appearance of owner of the goods, and so were now personally barred from denying that ownership. 26 Indeed, it is unnecessary if delivery has not occurred, for then the seller will still be in possession and can retain the goods against performance by the buyer. This will be on the basis of the seller's lien if the seller is still owner. On the seller's lien, see Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 41-43. 27 1 Feb 1809, FC. 28 As we shall see, it has subsequently been held that intimation to the revenue officer was not sufficient, and that intimation should instead be made to the warehousekeeper.
The third group held that Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was correctly decided, taking the view that a delivery order gives only a right to require delivery.
"Constructive delivery" was considered to be only an "equitable expedient" for the purposes of commerce and not to be delivery in the strictest sense. In reaching this view, this group referred to two cases of, it must be said, doubtful relevance. The first of these was Viscount of Arbuthnott v Paterson. 29 In that case, tenants of the Viscount of Arbuthnott, who were under an obligation to convey grain to the Viscount, were instructed instead to deliver the grain to a third party to whom the Viscount had sold the grain. However, as the tenants were owners of the grain until delivery, 30 this appears to be not a transfer of the Viscount's civil possession -he had no such possession -but rather an assignation of a personal right to get delivery from the tenants. It is settled, then, that delivery of goods may be made while those goods remain in the hands of a third party. 35 Before considering the basis of this, however, we must consider how this form of delivery operates. delivery was held to have taken place upon acceptance by the holding third party of an intimation from the transferor instructing that henceforth the thing be held on behalf of the transferee.
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In fact, in the reported cases intimation is typically made by the transferee by means of a delivery order addressed by the transferor to the custodier. The practical benefit of this approach is obvious:
Where A agrees to transfer the property in goods to B, and the transfer is to be effected by constructive delivery, B is the person who has the interest to intimate to the custodian the change of possession, because to complete his 35 There has been some doubt as to whether this extends to the creation of a right of pledge. In Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152 it was held that a pledge could not be created by a transfer of civil possession, the result being in fact an outright conveyance, albeit one subject to an obligation to reconvey. However intimation is made, though, it must be borne in mind that the function of intimation is to allow the party to whom it is made to know to whom he must perform his obligations. Accordingly, the intimation must refer to the transfer of the goods.
Thus, in Eadie v Mackinlay, 39 where the transferee merely informed the custodier's trustee in sequestration that the custodier held hides belonging to him, this was held insufficient intimation.
Gordon states that the instruction to hold the goods for the transferee must actually be received by the custodier. 40 Neither of the cases he cites as authority for this 41 actually says anything on this point, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it is the case. 43 In that case, P had agreed to buy from a manufacturer a quantity of iron forming part of the manufacturer's stock. P then engaged C as an agent to find a purchaser for the iron and, on being informed by C that a purchaser had been found, P indorsed the delivery order in C's favour. In fact there was no purchaser, and C subsequently sold to R. It was observed that the transaction between P and C could only have been an assignation of a personal right to delivery of the iron, in part because the iron had not 47 In that case, a distiller had sold a quantity of whisky, but had kept it in its own warehouse. There then followed over a period of six years a number of sub-sales, each intimated to the distiller but in each case the whisky remaining in the distiller's custody. The final purchaser became bankrupt, whereupon ownership of the whisky was disputed. In the Inner House the majority 48 took the position adopted here that, no delivery having been made to the first purchaser, all that could be conveyed by the first purchaser was a personal right to take delivery and become owner.
However, the Lord Ordinary and, in the Inner House, Lord Mure, took a position that is, with respect, difficult to follow. They both seem to accept that there was no delivery to the first purchaser, but hold that there had been delivery to 44 The point is most clearly made by the Lord President, at 629. 45 The Scottish courts, it must be said, are not the first to fail to make the distinction clear. , where it is said that a "fictitious delivery of possession also takes place between three persons by delegation, when, for instance, a man wishes to give me something, or owes it, and I order him to give it to another. For that is the same as if the thing had first been given to me, and then handed over by me to a third party". As it is made clear that delivery must be made to me to make me owner, for this passage to make sense delivery must also have been made to the third party. This, however, is not stated: all we are told is that the order has been given for delivery to the third party. 46 making intimation himself, 54 assuming the case was one in which delivery was required, but that would still involve the complication that the custodier would not know about the previous conveyance, and so would be reluctant to hand over the goods to the final acquirer. However, the position seems clear.
D. BASIS OF DELIVERY BY INTIMATION TO A THIRD PARTY CUSTODIER
It appears, then, that delivery of goods in the custody of a third party may be made by intimation to that third party. The goods need not be removed from the third party's custody. Unfortunately, while this much is clear, the basis of the recognition of this form of delivery is less clear. Three possibilities have been suggested.
(1) Expansion of rule for bills of lading
Where goods are being transported by sea, delivery of the goods may be made by delivery of a bill of lading issued by the carrier to the shipper. 55 It has been suggested that delivery by intimation to a third party custodier is a development of this rule.
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There is indeed some similarity, with a delivery order addressed to the custodier normally taking the place of the bill of lading. For this view, it may be noted that, in this cannot be conclusive. At this point, these cases were almost the only authorities that could be argued to be relevant to the question. As we have seen, there were no cases directly in point, so it is hardly surprising that counsel for the trustee seized on them. This, however, was not the ultimate basis for the decision in the House of Lords.
The argument that this form of delivery is derived from the practice on bills of lading faces the difficulty that no notice to the custodier is required in the case of a bill of lading, contrary to the requirements for the form of delivery with which we are 54 Reid, Property (n 2) paras 677-678. 55 Reid, Property (n 2) para 621 (Gordon). 56 concerned. For R Brown, the reason for the difference is that a bill of lading is issued by the custodier, the carrier of the goods. In other cases, the custodier is not involved in the issue of a delivery order. The owner may have issued several delivery orders, but the custodier can only be bound to implement the first presented to him:
The custodier cannot be held responsible for loss arising from his acting on the instructions of the only owner he knows -the only person to whom under his contract he has rendered himself responsible.
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However, much the same can be said of bills of lading issued in sets, as indeed Brown notes. 59 He considers, however, that the issue of bills in sets is less likely to lead to fraud on account of three factors.
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First, he says, the goods are at sea and so incapable of actual delivery.
However, it may be suggested that, if anything, this is more likely to lead to fraud rather than less, as (at least in the days before modern communications) fraudulent multiple sales would be less likely to be prematurely exposed by purchasers contacting the carrier.
Second, Brown notes that a bill of lading also embodies the contract of carriage: "[a] contract to which third persons are parties is not exposed to the same risk of fraudulent duplication." 61 He does not, however, explain why this should be the case.
Third, bills issued in sets state that fact and the number issued, "which, to some extent, puts an indorsee upon enquiry." 62 This, however, is a weak protection at best. As Brown himself says, 63 it is only necessary to present one of a set of bills of lading, performance of which by the carrier cancels the others.
In addition, on Brown's view it ought to be the case that intimation is not required where the custodier has been a party to the issue of the delivery order.
Indeed, Brown goes further, appearing to suggest that it should be enough just to intimate the first transfer, "for the custodier knows that he is holding the goods under a delivery order which is still in currency and that it is at his peril if he delivers the goods to anyone who does not deliver up the order duly indorsed to the presenter".
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There is, however, no trace in the case law of such a rule.
(2) Traditio longa manu
Roman law recognised a form of delivery, known as traditio longa manu, that involved "pointing out the thing to the transferee, and authorising him to take it, in such conditions that it was in his immediate power to do so". 65 Examples in the texts include delivery of objects too heavy to move 66 by pointing them out 67 and the giving of possession of land by pointing it out from a tower.
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Gordon suggests that delivery by the transfer of civil possession is a form of delivery longa manu, as a "development of the principle implicit in D.46.3.79".
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This, a passage from Javolenus, reads as follows:
Should I direct you to put money or anything else which you owe me where I can see it, the result is that you are released at once and that it becomes mine.
For in such a case, no one else having physical control of the thing, it is acquired by me, and in a sense, there is deemed to be a delivery by the long hand.
According to Gordon, the principle implicit in this passage is that "there is delivery by giving instructions which put the thing out of the control of the present possessor and into the control of the acquirer". 69 Reid, Property (n 2) para 620 (Gordon); Gordon, Traditio (n 9) 217. 70 Gordon, Traditio (n 9) 217.
plausible on the basis that the giving of the instructions to a third party is an obvious possible extension of the notion of delivery by an act which brings about a shift of control from transferor to transferee.
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However, although the phrase manu longa tradita is used by Javolenus, the example he gives seems more like a normal delivery of direct control if, as Thomas reasonably assumes, 72 this takes place within the creditor's own premises. In other words, Javolenus seems to be concerned with a quite different situation. The other texts identified as relating to traditio longa manu seem to relate to cases where, at best, there is not so much a taking of control by the transferee as there is a permission to take control.
Gordon is not alone in identifying this form of delivery with traditio longa manu. In the Netherlands and Belgium, for example, this form of delivery is recognised and is given this name. 73 However the situation may be for those countries, though, it is not clear that in Scots law there is any sound basis for believing this form of delivery to be derived from traditio longa manu. For one thing, the requirement to intimate to the custodier distinguishes this form of delivery from the traditio longa manu. No such requirement appears in the Roman sources, either for the traditio longa manu or the traditio clavium, which Gordon considers to be a form of traditio longa manu. 74 In the case of a traditio clavium, the goods may nonetheless have some sort of custodian, perhaps the keeper of a warehouse containing the area in which the goods are locked. Nonetheless, it does not appear that intimation to that custodian is required in the case of a traditio clavium. If both that and the present form of delivery are examples of traditio longa manu, there seems to be no obvious reason why, in the former case, the handing over of a delivery order to the transferee should not be enough, without any requirement for intimation. It is also notable that there is no reference in the case law to this form of delivery being based on traditio longa manu. Of course, this factor should not be given too much weight:
the term constitutum possessorium does not seem ever to have been used by a Scottish court, but as we have seen that form of delivery has certainly been recognised at least 74 Reid, Property (n 2) para 620 (Gordon); Traditio (n 9) 216.
to some extent. Nonetheless, it is a factor that is at least unsupportive of Gordon's view. Nor is there any evidence that, when the present form of delivery came to be recognised, it was seen as being based on traditio longa manu. Indeed, M P Brown, Suppose I want to assign a right to payment of a sum of money. When the assignation is intimated to the debtor, the assignee steps into my shoes and becomes the creditor.
The duty to pay is no longer owed to me, but to the assignee.
What if, instead, the duty to be assigned is a duty to hold goods on my behalf?
As long as this duty is owed to the party who originally placed the goods in the custodier's hands, the custodier has no authority to deliver the goods to anyone else without consent, even a known purchaser. 77 The custodier's position is determined by the contract in terms of which he holds the goods, and the possessor retains possession because of the contractual duties owed to him. Does it then follow that, if those contractual duties are assigned to another, the assignee will acquire possession?
Although the Scots law of possession is influenced by Roman law, Roman law did not recognise that delivery could occur when the goods were held by a third party.
Nor did Roman law recognise the assignation of personal rights. 78 From these facts, 75 MP Brown, Sale (n 16) 392-393. 76 There are some restrictions. For example, alimentary rights may not be assigned, nor may rights in respect of which there is delectus personae. For discussion, see Anderson, (n 37) paras 10-31 -10-32. 77 Smith v Allan & Poynter (1859) 22 D 208. 78 An obligation was seen as personal to the parties. It was possible for a creditor to authorise another to enforce a claim in his own name (procuratio in rem suam), but in principle the identity of the creditor did not change. Post-classical modifications did, however, give to this arrangement much of the practical effect of an assignation. For a full account of these developments, see R Zimmermann, The view then would be that this form of delivery operates, not directly by a transfer of control, but by a transfer of personal rights against the person who has that control. There is nothing in this idea that is novel or unique to Scotland, as we have seen. This is certainly the way that Bell appears to see the matter: this form of delivery operates, he says, by a "complete transfer of the custodier's duty". 83 In other words, delivery happens because the right to enforce that duty has been assigned to 79 For an overview of the requirements of European jurisdictions, see DCFR 1020-24. Along with Scotland, intimation is also required to complete an assignation in France. 80 the goods remained unmoved, but the right to the cellar, and to the services of the keeper, was transferred, so that they were equally put into the civil possession of the buyer.
If the seller had demanded access to the goods, the custodier would have been entitled to refuse, but the buyer was entitled to such access, because the personal rights held McLaren, in a note in the seventh edition of Bell's Commentaries, suggests that the idea of delivery by intimation arose by "confounding a delivery order with an assignation." 86 Although he is critical of this idea, he finds some support for it in the case law, 87 and holds that otherwise "there appears to be no legal ground for holding that mere notice or intimation to a non-assenting creditor should operate a change of constructive possession from vendor to vendee". 88 Again, R Brown finds it "natural and proper" that intimation should be adopted as a requirement, by analogy with assignation. The use of the term "intimation" also suggests a link with assignation.
Intimation, at least in the context of assignation, is a somewhat technical term and does not mean simply notification. 90 All of this is suggestive that the assignation of personal rights against the custodier is the most plausible candidate as the basis for this form of delivery. This avoids the theoretical objections that have led to the rejection of this form of delivery in South Africa. South African law has adopted the English requirement for attornment, referred to earlier, the acceptance by the custodier that he now holds for the transferee. The assignation approach has been rejected in South Africa on the basis that only incorporeals can be assigned, not ownership. 91 In the suggested Scots approach, by contrast, there is no attempt to assign ownership directly. Instead, what is assigned is the personal right forming the basis of the transferor's civil possession. 92 The difficulty with this view becomes apparent, however, on consideration of the law on assignation of personal rights. Delivery of this form is most commonly carried out by the delivery to the transferee of a delivery order, addressed by the transferor to the custodier, this delivery order then being intimated to the custodier. It does not seem that there can be any objection to the delivery order as a deed of assignation. Even if the delivery order is not drafted in terms of an assignation, it has been held that the intention to assign a personal right may be implied. 93 Even if this has been doubted, 94 the requirements are not particularly stringent, with no need for particular words. 95 Any objection must therefore be that there is insufficient intimation.
Intimation at common law was done notarially. 98 There is no evidence that intimation to the custodier in these circumstances has ever been done by common law notarial intimation. However, while it is not enough for the debtor merely to be aware of the assignation, 99 the common law has also accepted the effectiveness of various substitutes for formal intimation. Where the debtor acts in such a way as to acknowledge the intimation, there is correspondence between the assignee and the debtor acknowledging the assignation, or where the assignee initiates court proceedings to enforce the obligation, it is accepted that the right has been validly assigned. 100 However, except for the last, which would rarely be relevant in a case of the kind we are concerned with, these require some action on the part of the debtor. Of course, in the case of delivery of goods in the custody of a third party, it would be normal and sensible for the custodier to acknowledge the intimation of the transfer and make a record of it. As we have seen, however, this does not seem to be required. In fact, the requirements outlined above for this form of delivery appear to fall well below the common law requirements for intimation to complete an assignation. On the other hand, with this form of delivery we are concerned with quite a different situation, which falls far outside the normal case of assignation of the right to payment of a debt. In the normal case, assignation will create a legal relationship between assignee and debtor which goes beyond the obligation merely to hold, for safekeeping, goods belonging to the assignee. It is of no great concern to the custodier for whom he holds the goods, and the ownership position is certainly of little concern to the custodier. Regardless of whether 98 See Anderson (n 37) paras 6-22 -6-23 for an account of the procedure. 99 ibid paras 6-21 -6-29. 100 ibid paras 7-11 -7-23.
ownership was transferred, assuming his fee was paid the custodier would have no reason, and no right, to refuse to hand over the goods to anyone presenting a delivery order addressed to the custodier by the party with whom he had originally contracted.
Equally, it is quite possible that goods kept under these circumstances may be conveyed to other parties several times before the custodier is finally expected to give natural possession of them. To require formal intimation each time would be unduly cumbersome. It is no great stretch of the imagination to suppose that the courts took the opportunity to create a new form of intimation, to allow delivery in these circumstances in a way that met the needs of commerce. This argument is hardly conclusive. While there is some support for it in the relevant literature and in judicial dicta, the issue never seems to have been directly addressed or considered in detail.
However, in light of the relevant literature and authorities, it seems at least arguable that this is indeed the basis of this form of delivery.
E. CONCLUSION
It is clear that, according to the common law, delivery of goods may be made by intimation to a third party who has custody of the goods. What is less clear is the basis on which such delivery operates. This article has attempted to outline the operation of this form of delivery, with a view to determining its basis. Suggestions of roots in the law of bills of lading or traditio longa manu do not seem to be borne out. Much more promising is the suggestion that this form of delivery is based on an assignation of the transferor's personal right against the custodier. On this argument, the custodier then ceases to hold the goods for the transferor and begins to hold them for the transferee.
As a result, the transferee acquires civil possession of the goods and delivery is complete.
This view is, however, faced with the difficulty that the requirements adopted in this form of delivery do not appear to comply with the common law requirements for intimation of an assignation. It is suggested, however, that while this means that the suggestion must necessarily be tentative in the absence of more direct support, this is not necessarily an insuperable objection.
If this is the correct view, a final point may be noted. It has been argued here that intimation to the custodier is needed because intimation is needed to complete an assignation of a personal right (in this case, the transferor's contractual rights against
